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Introduction
Parliaments are multi-taskers. They perform a large number of functions, including the election or selection of the government, policy-formulation and legislation, controlling the government and holding it accountable, aggregating and representing the interests of their citizens and informing them on important policy issues. Among the most important means for parliaments to fulfil a range of these functions, and most importantly the information and communication function, are public debates in the plenary or -to a lesser extent -in committees. Debates are vital elements of electoral competition as they provide for a public articulation of societal interests and the discussion of policies thus informing citizens about complex political issues. Without debates allowing the electorate to identify competing leaders and policy agendas it is difficult for them to assess the performance of the government and to hold it accountable.
As mentioned in the introduction to this volume, previous research has suggested that the role of the plenary has so far been limited in European issues (Bergman, Müller, Strøm, & Blomgren, 2003, p. 175) .
However, this comparative data is somewhat dated, and it is possible that the debates on transparency in EU affairs as well as on the role of national parliaments in EU governance have led to a greater involvement of the plenary. Recent research at least suggests that more salient EU topics -such as financial frameworks (De Wilde in this issue), Treaty reforms (Maatsch, 2010) , or European Council meetings (European Parliament, 2013; van de Steeg, 2010 ) -do appear to trigger plenary debates. In addition, previous research has paid hardly any attention to the variation between legislatures or policy areas, nor to the relationship between parliamentary cultures and debates.
Hence this study contributes to the literature through a comparative analysis of EU debates i in four member states: Finland, France, Germany and the UK. In the next section we discuss both institutional and partyrelated factors that may impact the emphasis of parliamentary debates and introduce our hypotheses. In section three we outline our case selection and data. Section four presents the longitudinal data on the overall level of plenary debates on European matters in the four countries. We show how both institutional and party related factors impact the level and nature of debates, with our findings confirming significant variation between both the four member states and different types of EU matters.
Institutional Context + Party Interests = Different Outcomes?
Our basic premise is intuitively very simple: the institutional context, expressed through different parliamentary rules and cultures, should produce variation in our dependent variable -parliamentary debates on EU issues. While European parliaments perform largely the same set of functions in their respective national systems, previous literature has shown there to be significant variation between the legislatures in terms of which function is emphasised most (Arter, 2006; Döring, 1995; Norton, 1998; Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2003) . In addition, national parliaments are party-political institutions, bringing together legislators representing different political parties. Government formation is based on bargaining between political parties, with the opposition parties trying to unseat the cabinet or increase their support in the run-up to the next elections. Parties are also responsible for setting the parliamentary rules of procedure: the agenda and powers of committees and the plenary as well as the rights of individual members and party groups are all decided by political parties. Hence any realistic explanation of parliamentary activities must also include the incentives of parties .
Institutional Factors
Turning to institutional factors first, a much-used distinction is that between 'working' and 'debating' parliaments (Arter, 1999, pp. 211-217) , or between 'legislating' and 'deliberating' parliaments (Loewenberg & Patterson, 1979) . Working parliaments are characterised by standing orders that emphasise committee work over plenary debates, with a parliamentary culture where MPs focus on scrutiny of documents in committees instead of grand speeches on the floor. As the name implies, in debating parliaments, on the other hand, the focus is more on plenary debates. In addition, debating legislatures are, on average, less consensual, with the opposition using the plenary to criticise the government. The 'ideal' example of a debating parliament is arguably the British House of Commons, with the Nordic parliaments constituting typical cases of working parliaments (Arter, 1999, pp. 211-217; Bergman & Strøm, 2011 MPs to put EU issues on the plenary agenda, the more plenary debates we can expect. This is especially the case regarding opposition rights. In parliamentary systems of government, public assessment and criticism of the government's actions is mainly the responsibility of the opposition, while we can hardly expect the majority party or parties to have a great incentive to engage in publicly scrutinising and much less criticising the government (Auel, 2007 
H7: Presence of anti-EU parties: the greater the share of Eurosceptical parties, the more we can expect parliaments to fulfil their communication function through plenary debates.

Case Selection and Data
The hypotheses developed above should be seen as neither complementary nor as necessarily competing.
Rather, we investigate what factors, and in which combination, have explanatory value with regard to the degree to which parliaments fulfil their communication function through public debates. We have therefore chosen the parliaments of four member states: Finland (Eduskunta), France (Assemblée Nationale), Germany (Bundestag), and the United Kingdom (House of Commons). The case selection is primarily explained by institutional and partisan variation, with the parliaments differing from one another in terms of parliamentary rules, EU scrutiny models, and party politics. Given the low number of cases, and the fact that some of the variables, especially the institutional factors, are difficult to quantify in a consistent and comparable manner, we do not attempt a quantitative analysis, but rather follow a qualitative-interpretative approach.
TABLE 1
Due to space limitations, we present the main institutional and party related variables for the four parliaments in Table 1 .
ii With regard to the dependent variable, we draw on two data sources: our first source consists of a longitudinal comparison of the share or amount of EU debates in the four parliaments between 2002 and 2010 as well as the issues debated in the plenary to gain insight into the general importance of parliamentary debates in EU affairs. In this context, we also examine whether the parliaments hold debates about European Council meetings (either ex ante or ex post). This choice is explained by the role of the European Council, which 'functions as the principal agenda-setter, the ultimate arbiter in decision-making, and the motor behind European integration' (van de Steeg, 2010, p. 118) .
Problematic for the comparative analysis is that identifying EU debates is rather difficult in some parliaments. The Bundestag and the Assemblée Nationale provide a list of what they regard as their 'EU debates' on their websites for the current and previous legislative periods. And while these may not include all debates that have an EU focus, one can argue that these are the debates both parliaments advertise as their debates on European issues. In the case of Germany and France, we therefore first calculated the share of plenary days with a major EU debate out of all plenary days. Yet given the differences in terms of overall parliamentary time spent in the plenary as well as the length of the debates for each topic, the sheer number of debates may be somewhat misleading. In a second step, we therefore drew on the Observatory of National Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL) data (see below) to calculate the average share of plenary time spent on EU issues. Both the Eduskunta and the House of Commons, in contrast, do not provide such information on their websites. Both have a search engine, but without going through the debates manually it is impossible to distinguish between debates on genuine EU issues and those where a key word (such as 'EU') was simply mentioned in a different context. Hence the analysis of Finland and the UK is based on other parliamentary documents and interviews.
iii In addition, we were able to expand our analysis to include the years 2010 to 2012 by drawing on a dataset established in the context of the OPAL project iv (Auel, Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2014, forthcoming) . It provides data on parliamentary activities in EU affairs between 2010 and 2012 including, inter alia, data on the number of EU debates, the topics as well as the share of plenary time devoted to debating EU issues.
Given that we had to resort to simpler means of identifying EU debates for the period of 2002 to 2010, our data is not directly comparable with the OPAL data. As a consequence, we are only able to draw tentative conclusions about changes over time in the level of debating activity.
For information regarding the institutional factors, we relied on parliamentary standing orders and the secondary literature (for details, see Auel & Raunio, 2012 When all these various forms of European debates are combined, it seems that the share of floor time spent on EU matters was roughly similar to that in the French Assemblée.
Since 2010, however, EU debates seem to have become somewhat more frequent. The OPAL data give an average of 22 to 23 debates per year, which amounts to 3.8 per cent of the overall plenary time. The share of debates on the financial crisis is lower than in the other chambers (26.7 per cent) but still rather high considering that the UK is not a member of the eurozone. In addition, a quarter of the debates were spent on the EU Bill of the Conservative government, the impact of the EU on the sovereignty of parliament and the possibility of a referendum over EU membership. The higher number of debates may also explain why the Labour party, in opposition since May 2010, made no use of their opposition days to discuss EU issues.
Only the Democratic Unionist Party used the opportunity once to discuss 'the European Union'. EU matters are debated in the chamber, while normal EU policies are dealt with exclusively in committees.
We believe that our results are primarily explained by party politics. Institutional factors do play a role, but only insofar as they serve either the interests of the government (especially in the UK) or the main party groups. In particular, our findings suggest that the general distinction between working and debating parliaments seems to have little explanatory value in EU affairs. This is especially true for the Bundestag, which is the most active when it comes to plenary debates on EU affairs, and the debating chamber House of Commons, which clearly emphasises committee work in EU affairs (see also Neuhold & de Ruiter, 2010) .
In Germany, parties used to be clearly more cohesive in their pro EU stance than parties in the three other countries, and given the rather broad support for European integration in the public, parties did not have to fear a serious electoral backlash due to anti-EU sentiments. In addition -and in contrast to the other parliaments -the government has more limited control of the parliamentary agenda as all party groups, including the opposition, have the opportunity to put their issues on the agenda. Hence in the Bundestag both the government and the main parties had less reason not to debate EU policies in the plenary, and both government and opposition groups use the opportunities to put EU issues on the agenda. More recently, cracks have appeared in the party consensus over the EU with the less pro-European stance of the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Eurosceptic Left List. Whether the increase in debates is a result of these developments is difficult to tell, especially given that internal party divisions over the EU have also increased.
In the other three parliaments, party politics clearly work against a politicisation of EU issues through plenary debates. This was especially the case in the House of Commons until 2010, where the Labour government had few incentives to politicise EU affairs. This was not only due to their internal division over Europe potentially triggering criticism from their own backbenchers, but also because public debates would have given the Eurosceptic Conservatives the opportunity to accuse the government publicly of 'selling out to Europe' and to score points with the Eurosceptic public and media. It is therefore hardly astonishing that British governments prefer to 'park' EU issues in the European Committees whose recommendations and opinions the governments can also safely ignore. Thus, in the UK, the Labour government used its firm control over the agenda to keep EU issues out of the plenary. And considering the internal splits of the Conservatives, even the main opposition party had fewer incentives to engage in public debates about Europe. As the data since 2010 show, debates have clearly increased under the Conservative/Liberal
Democrat coalition government, but with over 50 per cent of the debates on the euro crisis, the EU Bill, parliament's role in EU affairs and the EU Referendum, the debate activity regarding other, 'regular', EU issues does not seem to have increased that much since 2010.
In the Assemblée, debate activity was fairly low between 2002 and 2010, and the slight increase since then seems mainly due to the euro crisis. Proposals for resolutions can be put on the agenda by party groups, and government control of the plenary agenda is therefore somewhat less tight in EU than in domestic affairs.
Reasons for the small share of EU debates thus lie not only with the governing parties but also with the opposition. Here, the internal divisions of the main parties over Europe also provide a strong disincentive to politicise EU issues. This is especially the case for the largest opposition party, the Socialist Party, which is characterised by severe internal dissent over the EU. In addition, the gap in support for European integration between the parties and the public has widened over recent years. Thus, even though in opposition until mid-2012, the Socialist Party had little to gain from initiating public debates. The two anti-EU right wing parties, the Front National and the Movement for France, finally, have little direct influence on the plenary agenda, although they do, of course, influence the French debate on the EU. While the Front National was not represented in the Assemblée until the latest elections in 2012 (now two MPs), the Movement for France had only three, currently two, MPs.
The absolute number of EU debates was clearly lowest in Finland, although we detect a steep increase since 2010, mainly due to the euro crisis and the politicisation of EU in the run-up to the 2011 Eduskunta elections. Here, institutional factors play a greater role since according to the constitution the plenary can debate EU matters but is not entitled to take decisions on such issues (with the exception of those questions that specifically require parliamentary ratification). This contributes to the Eduskunta essentially only debating 'high politics' EU matters in the chamber. The Eduskunta is also exceptional as it is the only parliament where European Council meetings are hardly ever debated on the floor. However, the decision to delegate EU affairs almost completely to the EAC and other committees is, of course, an intentional decision of political parties who have designed a scrutiny system for EU affairs which is geared towards achieving a broad domestic consensus behind closed doors rather than making EU affairs a matter of public party competition. In addition, parties are not only internally divided over Europe, the gap in opinion between the parties and their voters also presents a problem, especially for the main pro-EU parties.
Although limited to four parliaments, our findings also shed a rather different light on the involvement of affairs. This finding is also supported by Auel et al. (2014) : with the exception of the Swedish Riksdag, most of the powerful mandating parliaments perform rather poorly when it comes to parliamentary debates.
This does suggest that strong parliamentary influence and a system geared towards mandating the government's negotiations position may come at a cost regarding transparency.
The picture painted by our limited investigation so far is rather bleak. Over the last two decades, parliamentary attention for EU issues has clearly increased, and national parliaments now also provide more information on EU politics and their own activities to their electorates, for example through the access to documents or minutes of committee meetings. While this may have increased the transparency of EU politics at the domestic level, it has not, however, led to a greater politicisation of EU politics or increased party competition over EU issues. Rather, the comparison suggests that plenary debates are more frequent in the absence of strong party political conflict and Eurosceptic public opinion. While specific and very controversial EU topics and decisions are being debated, so far most parliaments do not live up to their task of bringing 'Europe' closer to the citizens or enabling them to make informed political (electoral) choices and to exercise democratic control on EU affairs. One exception is the euro crisis, which seems to have increased the share of debates in all four parliaments, but especially in Finland. In addition, there are indications in the literature that the debates over the crisis are also highly polarised, mainly along pro and anti integration cleavages in the UK, and along party cleavages in Germany (Wendler, 2012 In an earlier, and much longer, version of this article, we also examined debates on three specific major EU issuesthe European Arrest Warrant, the Services Directive, and the decisions to provide financial aid to Greece through the establishment of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism in May-June 2010 -in detail (Auel & Raunio, 2012) . Due to space limitations, we had to cut this analysis from the final version.
ii See Auel and Raunio (2012) for a detailed discussion of the institutional and party-related variables.
iii We carried out interviews with selected MPs and parliamentary civil servants in the four countries. We are particularly grateful to Graham Ziegner and Peter Saramo for their generous help regarding the House of Commons and the Eduskunta data.
